turn-of-the-century discovery that mosquitoes transmitted the disease confirmed an environmentalist approach to malaria and made its management the domain of scientists in the field-usually entomologists and sanitary engineers. These experts attacked the problem in the landscape rather than in the human body: they drained wetlands, redirected waterways, and made landscaping recommendations; they sprayed oils and arsenics on mosquito breeding grounds; and in the postwar era they embraced the use of DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons to kill adult mosquitoes and their larvae. The work of these entomologists and sanitarians, and to a lesser extent physicians, has dominated much of the recent historical discussion about malaria in the United States.
5 But a closer look at malaria research in the interwar and postwar years reveals another influence altogether: that of field biologists who approached the problem from the perspective of ecology, an approach that developed in direct opposition to contemporary efforts at environmental manipulation. This approach to malaria research also offers an early glimpse at the type of thinking that would eventually coalesce around the field of disease ecology.
Disease ecology is a relatively new interdisciplinary field within the disciplines of ecology and the biomedical sciences. Its origins are usually dated to the 1980s, when a series of emerging diseases vexed researchers and new strains of other diseases shook our confidence in the power of antibiotics. Such developments brought evolutionary questions of competition and the interrelations of organisms to the forefront of thought on disease, with proponents of an ecological approach arguing that global environmental change was facilitating an onslaught of new and more destructive diseases. 6 This approach seemed novel, but several scholars have recently found much deeper seams of ecological thought within the biomedical sciences. J. Andrew Mendelsohn has found ecological thinking about infectious diseases among practitioners in the early twentieth century. He argues that such thinking developed across many disciplines, including from within the ranks of "medical men" who faced a puzzling set of emerging diseases during and after World War I, not unlike disease ecologists later in the century. Helen Tilley has located the roots of disease ecology in the processes of imperialism, especially in the work of turn-of-the-century British scientists studying tsetse flies and trypanosomiasis in Africa. An increasing awareness of the complexity of vector-borne diseases, Tilley argues, led researchers to develop cross-disciplinary networks in an effort to construct a full understanding of the ecology of disease. Paul Sutter has also examined tropical medicine for ecological strains of thought and found them in the efforts of the United States to build the Panama Canal. Fieldworkers there came to understand that large mosquito populations were as much the result of disturbed environments as they were elements of tropical nature, leading them to look for ecological fixes to medical problems. In addition, Warwick Anderson has followed the work of the infectious disease researchers Theobald Smith, F. Macfarland Burnet, René Dubos, and Frank Fenner, all of whom began to use an ecological lens on infectious disease research long before disease ecology developed into a field of its own. 7 Collectively, these scholars demonstrate that the germ theory of disease never held the dominance we once thought; it was overlooked, ignored, or chipped away by field scientists in infectious disease research and related disciplines even as it was beginning to gain a stronghold among medical professionals. More crucially, they also show how innovative research programs move in fits and starts and are rooted in particular social and historical moments that often dictate their dissemination or demise.
This essay adds to this growing body of work, but it does so from the regional perspective of the southeastern United States. The South was a critical hub in the transnational distribution of expertise in what became known as "tropical" diseases. Organizations like the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) and the Rockefeller Foundation, in conjunction with state health departments, set up a sprawling public health infrastructure in the early twentieth century to curtail a number of diseases that persisted in the colonial-like setting of the region. Entomologists, sanitary engineers, and physicians imported the environmental control techniques they had developed in the tropics and honed them in the more familiar milieu of the South; they then, in turn, exported them anew across the globe. While it is appealing to follow such a unilateral movement of knowledge and experience, Warwick Anderson and Steven Palmer have recently complicated our understanding of early U.S. disease control efforts. In constructing their genealogies of global public health workers, they demonstrate that knowledge and personnel came from a variety places at a variety of times and did not simply move in a straight line from one place to another. 8 In his work on the Philippines, Anderson has shown that U.S. colonial health workers at the turn of the century were closely connected to each other and that the knowledge they carried was closely tied to specific tropical places. And Palmer complicates things even further by charting the diverse organizational origins of workers in the Rockefeller Foundation International Health Division and the significant influence of local actors on the execution of its hookworm projects in the Caribbean. Their genealogies reveal a shift among American specialists from a racialized view of tropical diseases that depended on the colonial military tactics of control and domination to a more technical, scientific, even ecological, approach that largely bypassed sufferers altogether. And as practitioners became more confident in their technical abilities, the general aim of disease work moved from control to eradication through environmental manipulation.
The Emory Field Station was very much a part of this larger biomedical genealogy, but a close examination of its field practice reveals another line of influence that shifted some focus away from disease eradication to a postsanitarian model of disease research. By the time of the station's founding in 1938, the family of disease researchers was expanding to include a number of fieldworkers steeped not only in the science of ecology but also in its worldview. As suggested above, an ecological view of disease was nothing new, but an embrace of its worldview was. Specifically, the ecological turn at the Emory Field Station grew from its close ties to an American conservation movement that increased in importance before and after World War II. 9 As an advocate in that movement, the station's director, Melvin Goodwin, embarked on an attempt to curtail the environmentally destructive methods of control that had long been embraced by sanitarians. These methods-moving land and water and spraying poisons on both-caused a great deal of concern among many American biologists, and the direct influence of wildlife biologists such as William Vogt, Herbert Stoddard, and Eugene Odum led Goodwin and his staff to ask questions about mosquito and malaria habitat instead of turning immediately to the standard of eradication. 10 Even while other PHS research sites embraced the widespread use of DDT after World War II, the Emory station used it only sparingly, in home spraying programs but not in the field; instead, they invested more time and effort in fieldwork such as water flow studies, vertebrate and invertebrate life history studies, botanical surveys, and a host of studies on mosquitoes themselves.
11 By shifting to a postsanitarian model of malaria control, the Emory Field Station went against the grain of eradication just as the miracle of DDT made it seem most attainable. Well before Rachel Carson's Silent Spring questioned the wisdom of eradication through chemicals, then, advocates in an earlier American conservation movement had already questioned the methods and assumptions of the disease control establishment.
The practical dimensions of this effort, however, were eventually undone by the disappearance of malaria in the United States. Regarding these practical dimensions, this essay draws on an active and growing literature on the history of field science. Historians of science in the field examine the constellation of social and environmental factors that come to bear on the making of field science; that is, they "put science in its place," to quote the geographer David Livingstone.
12 Whereas Warwick Anderson has referred to turn-of-the-twentieth-century U.S. medical workers as "itinerants" who were passing through, carrying and building on their knowledge as they traveled from outpost to outpost in the course of building an American empire, the history of field science offers another way of seeing disease scientists. Robert Kohler's concept of "residential" science is an especially apt descriptor of the Emory Field Station staff.
13 Like Anderson's colonial workers, they possessed a cosmopolitan view of the world and they moved around a lot; but they also took up residence in a way that influenced their science. The Emory Field Station was embedded within the complex social and environmental landscape of the rural American South, which blended racial subjugation, paternalism, and environmental manipulation in ways that directly affected the ability of Goodwin and his staff to do science in the field. The staff dealt with the complexities of the field on a daily basis: they made astute staffing decisions to "make nice" with the local community; they learned to navigate a countryside of unmarked roads and nebulous swampy terrain; and they left their own mark on a rural landscape dominated by the activities of row-crop agriculture and recreational hunting. Science, in other words, became another product of the region's environment; and as the social, political, economic, and environmental context shifted, so, too, did scientific production.
MALARIA CONTROL'S PAST
Robert Woodruff was never wild about inviting a team of researchers to descend on his property. He pieced Ichauway together in the late 1920s and early 1930s-about 30,000 acres in all-as a retreat, a place to escape the demanding life of modern business. It was also a haven where he could make business deals under the relaxed circumstances of exclusive field sport, perhaps during the mid-morning lull of a quail hunt or at the card table afterward. Indeed, the idea for the field station came from such conversations. Woodruff and other southern leaders had long been concerned about the toll of malaria on the rural labor force of the South. He began to think seriously about the problem of malaria during a stay at Ichauway in the fall of 1937, when he had a long discussion with his farm superintendent, Roy Rogers, about some possible remedies for the region's health problems. Rogers knew of a small organization in Thomas County, the Malaria Research Foundation, that had been administering a new synthetic substitute for quinine called Atabrine. He soon contacted the men in charge of that effort-the physician Roy Hill and his able assistant Melvin Goodwin-about the possibility of bringing doses of Atabrine to Baker County. They did, and soon after learning of the local goodwill engendered by those visits, Woodruff began talking to his contacts at Emory University, as well his friends in the Atlanta business community and the Georgia Department of Public Health (GDPH), about organizing a temporary effort at malaria control using Ichauway as its land base.
14 (See Woodruff approached the project with caution. As he told the Atlanta lawyer Robert Troutman, "I'm not 'rearing' to do this particular thing, but if it is the opinion of the authorities that it will be very constructive and beneficial . . . I might be inclined to really make the effort." He was interested in any "constructive thing that would improve the health conditions in [Baker] county, but would want to be sure that . . . there would be no obligation of any kind to carry it on beyond the prescribed period" of two years. For Woodruff and his collaborators, the idea was to determine malaria's extent in the area, knock it out with the medicine, and then let the field scientists be on their way. Thinking back years later, he was frank about his motivations for the project: "I wasn't thinking of it as a humane program, because it was an economic situation, too. A man that is ill can't work. He's no good." 15 He had little interest in supporting research on the mechanics of mosquito and malaria ecology. The field scientists themselves, however, would eventually have something else in mind.
The early years of the Emory Field Station proceeded along the path of most antimalaria projects in the South, a path established decades earlier with the discovery that mosquitoes spread the disease. The real cause of malaria is not the mosquito itself, but a protozoan of the genus Plasmodium, a parasite that passes from host to host only via female Anopheles mosquitoes. Five malaria plasmodia infect humans, but only P. vivax and the more lethal P. falciparum were ever a concern in the Americas. 16 Worldwide, dozens of anopheline mosquitoes are capable of transmitting the plasmodium, but A. quadrimaculatus was the malaria vector of note in the American South. The quad, as it came to be known, is a native of North America and was a ready recipient of vivax and falciparum malaria when early European settlers and African slaves brought the parasites with them in their bloodstreams. 17 Eighteenthand nineteenth-century Americans knew malaria as the fever, ague, or chills and considered it a result of bad air, the legendary miasmas that infected low-lying areas such as swamps and coastal marshes. Such areas abounded in the South, and the ecological transformation of the region for agricultural production helped to make it even more productive of malaria. The kind of watery environments that tend to follow the land-moving activities of plantation agriculture-stillwater pools and back-forty swamps-made perfect breeding grounds for the quad. The agroecologies of coastal rice production were famously malarious, as were those of upland cotton, especially in areas of karst geology where natural features such as "limesinks" predominated. These bodies of water would dry up intermittently and thus did not harbor many fish-a primary predator of mosquito larvae-making them even more prone to large breeding populations of mosquitoes. As large-scale cotton agriculture advanced across the South in the nineteenth century, malaria became endemic in much of the region. 18 Even after the role of mosquitoes became clear, physicians and laypersons held on to many ideas about miasmas for years to come. The discovery of the mosquito vector actually confirmed the dangers of swampy environments for many, but it also presented new alternatives for fighting malaria. Although the human body remained a site of the disease, and physicians continued to search for effective prophylactics, the mosquito vector became the focus of most control efforts; thus the responsibility for malaria control shifted gradually from physicians to entomologists and sanitary engineers. The imperial efforts of the United States to control and "sanitize" tropical places made quick studies of these experts, and their successes with yellow fever in Cuba and malaria in the Panama Canal Zone established their supremacy in dealing with vector-borne disease. Pioneers such as William Gorgas, L. O. Howard, and Joseph LePrince studied the behavior and preferred habitats of Anopheles and Aedes (the yellow fever vector) mosquitoes and developed detailed protocols for killing them, diminishing their habitat, and segregating them from humans. Scientists in the tropics also came to recognize human-caused environmental change-such as the massive land-moving project in Panama-as an aid to malaria's spread. The stillwater pools and stagnant drainage ditches that proliferated in the Canal Zone, for instance, provided ideal breeding grounds for Anopheles mosquitoes. 19 The turn-of-the-century campaigns in Cuba and Panama informed every project that followed in the United States and abroad. Indeed, colonial public health officers left Panama as heroes and descended on places such as the U.S. South, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines to replicate their successes. Joseph LePrince, for instance, became one of the most soughtafter malaria technicians in the South after he completed his work in Panama in 1914. As the director of the malaria control section of the U.S. Public Health Service, he trained others in the techniques he had developed in the tropics and led the effort to control malaria at southern military installations during World War I. Along with Thomas Griffitts of the PHS, LePrince identified A. quadrimaculatus as the primary vector of human malaria in North America and also determined the quad's one-mile flight range, a critical step toward identifying vulnerable human populations. 20 Veterans of the U.S. colonial enterprise also infiltrated the Rockefeller Foundation's ambitious public health programs. Its Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm worked throughout the South from 1909 to 1914, a project that would provide critical experience for the foundation's International Health Division in other parts of the world. The International Health Division took aim at a number of tropical diseases, beginning in 1913 with hookworm in the Caribbean and then malaria, yellow fever, and influenza in places as far-flung as Italy, the Philippines, India, Mexico, and Colombia. The U.S. South remained a core location of Rockefeller activity after the hookworm program, and the organization sent scores of health workers to train in the region before heading abroad. 21 Like the efforts in Panama, the malaria projects of the International Health Division focused on attacking the mosquito vector by ditching, draining, and oiling watery areas. By the early 1920s, they turned to spraying Paris green, an arsenic-based compound long used in agriculture and silviculture that had recently proved effective in killing Anopheles larvae. Indeed, before the development of DDT, Paris green was by far the most common insecticide used in malaria control projects during the interwar years.
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The Emory Field Station had several direct connections with the Rockefeller programs. The foundation had maintained a malaria program in the neighboring town of Leesburg, Georgia, in the 1920s, and the Rockefeller malariologist Mark Boyd carried out important work just down the road in Tallahassee, Florida, throughout the lifespan of the Emory Field Station. Though much of Boyd's work was medical in nature and loosely related to that of the field station, he visited often and would provide suggestive evidence connecting areas of karst geology with high malaria rates, a link that would form one of the research bases for the field station's turn to ecology. 23 The South, then, became a critical space for designing public health programs and training workers in the methods of disease surveillance and sanitary engineering. Through their efforts both in the South and abroad, workers in the PHS, the Rockefeller Foundation, and state health departments implemented what became standard protocols for mapping and eradicating disease by the interwar years. The Emory Field Station was among the secondgeneration progeny of these efforts, and there was little initial indication that it would amount to much more than a routine post in the South's public health structure. But the loose structure of the field station mimicked the overall structure of global public health, with multiple sources of authority and influence that ultimately allowed a great deal of autonomy for the project. 24 No fewer than five organizational entities-Woodruff, Emory, the Georgia Department of Public Health, the PHS, and the CDC-had an interest in the station at one time or another, and none could claim complete control over its research agenda. The result was the eventual consignment of control to Goodwin, who had latitude to pursue a broad range of research interests and to call on a number of field scientists not usually involved in infectious disease research.
ICHAUWAY ENTERS THE FRAY
The at the University of the Philippines in Manila, both leading institutions of public health education. Andrews developed a two-pronged research program that mirrored many of the previous efforts in the tropics and the South. He sought to determine the relationship between groundwater fluctuations, mosquito density, and malaria and to study what he called the "time-honored problem of environmental factors which condition the production of Anopheles quadrimaculatus."
25 Melvin Goodwin, still enrolled as an undergraduate at the University of Georgia at the time, became responsible for directing this research on the ground as the station's appointed field biologist. Luther R. Mills, on loan from the U.S. Geological Survey, began mapping the area and devising a plan to survey its hydrological and geological characteristics; and two nurses from Albany, an African-American woman named Victoria Thompson and a white woman named Holliday, came on board to organize home visits in the community.
The first task for all involved was to learn something of the area's social, geographic, and environmental dynamics. Baker County sits in the middle of a physiographical area known as the Dougherty Plain, a relatively flat expanse of karst topography in southwest Georgia. When the Emory Field Station began operation in 1939, Baker County's social and economic milieu was dominated by the legacies of slavery. In the 1850s, it had become part of one of the largest inland plantation districts of the South, attracting migrant planters who brought their slaves with them from piedmont sections of Georgia and South Carolina. Little changed after emancipation, as the sharecropper and tenant system took hold. Rural segregation kept educational opportunities at a minimum for African Americans, and the crop-lien system kept them in perpetual debt. The 1920s and 1930s saw the arrival of a handful of hunting preserves in this agricultural landscape, a phenomenon that brought wealthy businessmen from the North and parts of the South in search of outdoor recreation. Plenty of land was available for such endeavors in the Depression-era market, and the agricultural system of tenantry produced desirable habitat for a number of game animals-especially bobwhite quail. Tenants, then, remained on most of these new preserves and largely continued to farm under arrangements much like those that had gone before.
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The countryside was sparsely populated throughout the first half of the twentieth century (there are even fewer residents today). In 1930, a total of 7,818 people lived within Baker County's 228,480 acres. Of those, 4,794 were black-not quite as disproportional as some plantation districts, but still a clear majority. Of the 108,866 acres in farms in 1930, 99,056 of them continued to be farmed by tenants or sharecroppers. There were 1,190 black and 700 white heads of household operating farms of all types in Baker County in 1930, while only 45 African Americans and 128 whites owned their own farms.
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On Ichauway, tenants received more supervision than those farming elsewhere. According to the posted rules of the "farm program" in 1939, "Tenants will be shown what and where to plant and must not break any land until the Superintendent shows them where to plow." All crops, "other than vegetables and meat raised for home consumption," were farmed on halves-a system whereby the sharecropper and the landowner split the harvest fifty-fifty. All tenants furnished their own stock, implements, and seed (or Ichauway would finance them if necessary), and Ichauway supplied fertilizer. In addition, Ichauway required tenants to plant 38 acres to the plow, with 8 acres in cotton, 10 acres in peanuts, and 20 acres in corn intermixed with velvet beans and cowpeas. 28 Woodruff and Rogers aimed to create "a model farming operation," and when combined with the home garden required of every tenant their plan represented a fairly diverse model in an otherwise cotton-reliant region. 29 Woodruff's efforts to make Ichauway a progressive rural enclave reflected a genuine concern for human well-being and economic progress. But the image of Ichauway he chose to present to visitors mirrored many of the still-popular conceits of a mythical Old South. As one self-published booklet from 1931 explained, one might find a "touch of the Old South" in this isolated pocket of southwest Georgia. Picture books about the place featured images of contented black tenant farmers and domestic help eager to serve, coupled with depictions of whites spending the day afield with gun on horseback or relaxing on a lakeshore with a picnic lunch. It was important to Woodruff that Ichauway remained both a working plantation and a place of respite. The 1931 booklet concluded, "Many white and negro families carry on the agricultural activities of Ichauway, living in standardized white tenant cottages located at convenient points over the plantation. . . . Thus, the visitor to Ichauway sees a daily blending of agricultural life with the sports of field and stream." The idea of providing medical care for residents fit perfectly with Woodruff's ideas of benevolent paternalism, and the early efforts of Goodwin and his staff were an extension of this mission to improve local living conditions, maintain a healthy workforce, and contribute to an image of Ichauway as a reservation for a mythical southern past.
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Tenants and their families experienced this place intimately, as they did its diseases. A combination of factors-the living conditions of tenantry, meager medical care, and the region's watery geography-made Baker County ripe for a number of diseases, including malaria. In supporting the field station, Woodruff hoped to alleviate, if not fix, some of the region's health problems, and he stipulated that basic medical care would be a part of the research program. This made for a busy start to the station's life. Nurses Thompson and Holliday, often accompanied by Goodwin, made a total of 9,025 home visits between April and December 1939 and, in an attempt to "secure the confidence and cooperation of the residents of Baker County," performed an array of services that went far beyond malaria screening. 31 The staff conducted general health clinics, midwife classes, school dental surveys, and first aid training; they treated or diagnosed a host of diseases, including anemia, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, and appendicitis; and they constructed sanitary privies to combat hookworm. Malaria, though, was their primary target. In those first nine months, nurses administered Atabrine treatments to 1,204 people and took 6,219 blood smears for malaria detection. 28 These showed that 64 African Americans and 24 whites carried the malaria plasmodium, and no deaths were attributable to malaria. 32 Malaria rates in the South had been on a steady decline for several years, and they would continue to dwindle from this point.
While the staff accomplished a great deal in these first few years before World War II, they also encountered several hurdles typical to such a young effort. Goodwin, for example, expressed frustration in the first progress report that the staff was not able properly to scout the location and develop adequate maps of the area before diving into their work. "The usual procedure," he wrote, "is to send the engineer in the field a year before other activities . . . [to create] an accurate map showing the locations of all houses, roads, and aquatic situations. . . . This was not possible since all activities had to be started at the same time." Baker County's population was widely dispersed, and the rural landscape, with its unmarked roads and meandering creeks and swamps, was difficult for outsiders to navigate. Such a quick start made the knowledge of locals all the more important to the task. Goodwin hired Robert Lofton, "a local 'handy man' [who] proved to be an indispensable assistant to the engineer in orientation of roads, and directions to various recognized land marks." In addition to Lofton, Thompson and Holliday were also familiar with the area. Nurse Thompson was particularly vital because her presence allayed any skepticism among the African-American population. Not surprisingly, her initial salary was lower than Holliday's, but Glenville Giddings, one of Woodruff's medical advisors on the project, thought "it would be well to pay Nurse Thompson the same amount; . . . with the Negroes, she is probably more valuable" than Nurse Holliday. 33 Indeed, Holliday would not return to the station after World War II.
Though the field station borrowed from existing strategies of malaria detection, Melvin Goodwin was beginning to see their mission as novel. As he wrote in the first annual report, "There have been few efforts to execute [malaria] research programs in the field independent of [malaria] control activities. . . . In the execution of field work we have tried to outline a program which would be of interest and value to agencies interested in research work other than that pertaining to malaria and hookworm." 34 Goodwin argued that the three traditional approaches to malaria control-attack the parasites in humans, attack the mosquitoes in their habitat, and separate humans from mosquitoes-contributed little to a general knowledge of malaria ecology or to an understanding of the specific habitats essential to A. quadrimaculatus. Indeed, beyond the mandated Atabrine treatments, traditional malaria control played a very small part in the station's research. "None of these [control approaches] is completely satisfactory," wrote Goodwin, and the "time-honored" method of draining mosquito-breeding habitat was particularly troubling; it had "been done promiscuously without evaluating its effect on water resources and conservation. Malaria Research Foundation. One of the trustees of that project, Herbert Stoddard, proved to be an important influence on Goodwin. Stoddard was a wildlife biologist and land manager best known for his work on bobwhite quail while employed by the U.S. Bureau of the Biological Survey; he was also a leader in an interwar conservation movement that was changing the ways Americans understood and interacted with the environment. Stemming from earlier Progressive Era concerns about dwindling natural resources and a faith in scientific expertise to provide a fix, the interwar movement also promoted basic science for its utility in mediating human-environmental relations. But it worked on an ethical level as well, which was best represented by the work of Stoddard's close friend Aldo Leopold. Drawing on his understanding of ecology as a science premised on interconnection, and human ethics as a set of moral principles premised on community, Leopold argued in one of his most celebrated essays for what he called a "land ethic," an idea that "simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land. care for environmental health, which is difficult to achieve without knowing something of what makes the environment tick. Such moral nuance animated the scientific work of a growing number of biologists in the interwar years. Herbert Stoddard was among them, and, as a trusted advisor, he encouraged Goodwin to find alternatives to the land-moving and drainage projects of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the PHS.
Stoddard was particularly impressed with the antidrainage campaigns of William Vogt, a leading ornithologist who would soon become a major figure in American conservation circles. In the meantime, Vogt was a serious thorn in the side of the nation's malaria control structure. His 1937 booklet Thirst on the Land was making the rounds within the nation's wildlife community just as Goodwin was beginning to develop the station's research agenda and was inspiring a growing resistance to many accepted methods of malaria control. Published by the National Association of Audubon Societies and produced in conjunction with Jay "Ding" Darling, a cartoonist and former director of the Biological Survey, the booklet was a fierce polemic that exposed the environmental damage caused by government drainage projects. In it, Vogt described the various physical characteristics of fresh-and saltwater wetlands, detailed their importance to human welfare and animal life, and articulated an argument for American wetlands as "a source of national wealth of the first magnitude." Drainage projects of many different types threatened that source, but Vogt reserved special contempt for "the malaria racket," his label for the drainage projects of the PHS. "Under the guise of 'education,'" he wrote, "officials concerned with mosquito control work have made sweeping claims without producing scientific proof" that drainage would actually lower malaria rates. "Many of their assertions, which are nothing more nor less than sales talks to support and swell the supplies of money they wish to spend, will not stand the test of logic."
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The presumed purpose of drainage was to reduce populations of A. quadrimaculatus, the only southern mosquito that mattered in the control of human malaria, and Vogt wanted at least to see evidence that the projects did what they were supposed to do.
Others were offering similar critiques of the PHS drainage projects. The Biological Survey voiced considerable opposition once the Works Progress Administration provided enough labor and funds to carry out drainage on a large scale. By the late 1930s, the Biological Survey ordered agents in the field to survey WPA operations in the southeastern states and to report on any projects they considered "unjustified drainage." They found many. Not only was "drainage for the control of malaria . . . done by the most destructive methods available"; it was usually unnecessary, according to one agent: "Many watered areas need not be drained, since the only mosquitos breeding are of species not a menace to public health." One of the most damning indictments of the drainage efforts came via Melvin Goodwin himself, who told an agent that he often dipped the larvae of A. quadrimaculatus out of malaria control ditches and "that they were more abundant in these ditches than in any natural watered areas." 38 Drainage, in other words, had the potential to make the problem even worse. Indeed, as one PHS scientist later recalled, "no precise method was used to determine the malaria hazard" ahead of WPA drainage, "nor was there a regular entomological or epidemiological service for evaluating the effectiveness of the work." 39 Between Vogt's polemic and the Biological Survey's persuasion, the PHS felt the heat from the nation's wildlife community and soon became more circumspect about its drainage activities.
After reading Thirst on the Land, Goodwin became an enthusiastic partisan for research over control. As he recalled sometime after the station closed, "At that time wildlife interests and conservationists were concerned about the extensive destruction of aquatic habitats to eliminate breeding of malaria-carrying mosquitos. For these and many other reasons, a thorough assessment of the ecology of malaria was needed." Toward that end, Goodwin eagerly sought Vogt's counsel. Stoddard acted as intermediary at first, telling Vogt of what he hoped would be a new approach to malaria work, something that would "furnish a club for the fight on general drainage of wildlife habitat." Vogt, though "skittish about some of these malaria control people," was encouraged to find in Goodwin a "malariologist saying exactly the same thing about the futility of malaria control by drainage that wild life people have been saying." 40 Vogt could offer little more than his stamp of approval on the project, but that was enough for Goodwin.
As he eased into a leadership role at the Emory Field Station, Goodwin looked for alternatives to drainage, oiling, and spraying by taking the biological research more seriously. Indeed, much like wildlife biologists who had come to see predator eradication as counterproductive earlier in the decade, Goodwin thought killing all the mosquitoes and wiping out their habitat had prevented scientists from learning something about them and their surroundings. Of A. quadrimaculatus, Goodwin wrote, "We know, for example, that there are certain watered areas in which these insects do not breed but we do not know why these places are unfavorable." Learning what natural factors attracted quads to some habitats and repelled them from others, Goodwin hoped, might lead to "a type of natural or biological control of malaria high in efficiency, presumably harmless to other wild life." 41 In some ways, this biological approach echoed earlier malariologists who looked into the surrounding environment for medical solutions; but, critically, the Emory Field Station came into being during a burgeoning age of ecology, when one of the most compelling views of the life sciences emphasized the interconnecting parts of nature and our ethical responsibility to protect its health as well as our own. Wildlife biologists such as Stoddard, Vogt, Leopold, and many others were already investigating the complexities of animal population dynamics and the consequences of altering habitats or eradicating species; it made sense for Goodwin to study disease vectors in a similar way. As malaria itself disappeared and the station's medical work began to seem superfluous to its mission, this ecological view eventually captured the station's research agenda.
WORLD WAR II
World War II, however, delayed the field station's anticipated shift toward ecological research. The station shut down in 1942, and Goodwin joined the brigade of malaria control officers in the U.S. Public Health Service charged with protecting the fighting forces at the many military bases popping up around the South. Justin Andrews, too, joined the effort as an Army malariologist and was assigned to malaria control activities in North Africa and the Pacific theater. Any inclination toward basic field research went out the window during the war. The PHS, already organized on a military command structure, did not have time to dawdle over such questions. Nonetheless, the war resulted in a tremendous expansion of U.S. capacity for combating disease. The PHS developed the Malaria Control in War Areas (MCWA) program, which was based in Atlanta and became "the most gigantic mosquito-control campaign carried out in the history of the world," according to one army official. The MCWA's early activities followed the old patterns of attacking mosquito larvae by draining, oiling, and spraying watery areas with Paris green, but by war's end they had embraced the seeming miracle that was DDT, an insecticide that effectively killed mosquitoes in both their larval and adult stages.
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As the war came to a close and officials began to process the overwhelming successes and institutional momentum of the MCWA program, they hatched a plan to continue their work during peacetime. The PHS had already organized their "extended program," an offspring of the MCWA that sought to protect civilians from the threat of malaria traveling in the bodies of returning military personnel. Soon the upper-tier leadership of both programs, including Louis Williams, Joseph Mountin, and Justin Andrews, successfully petitioned Congress and the PHS to establish a permanent organization in Atlanta for the control of malaria and other communicable diseases. By July 1946, what had been the MCWA officially became the Communicable Disease Center-later to become the Centers for Disease Control. 43 If the South was already an important location for the development of knowledge about disease before the war, it would be even more so afterward.
In the meantime, Mel Goodwin had risen through the ranks of the PHS, and by war's end he was a lieutenant, soon to become a captain. Malaria was largely gone from the South by then, but most malariologists still thought the disease was cyclical, so the PHS set up monitoring stations throughout the South to wait for its expected return. The Emory Field Station became one of those stations, along with two other outposts in Manning, South Carolina, and Helena, Arkansas. In 1944 the PHS worked out a deal with Emory and Woodruff to bring personnel back to Ichauway for research and monitoring, and the new CDC took over in July 1946. For Emory's part, the biology department joined with the School of Medicine to take an integral role in the field research. As an Emory administrator, Robert Mizell, told Woodruff before the war, "From the beginning, this was a project which Emory Medical School was not in position to handle" because of the nonmedical fieldwork. 44 With
Justin Andrews entrenched in a CDC leadership role in Atlanta, Goodwin, who had received his undergraduate degree in biology only in 1941, took over as the revamped station's on-site director because of his familiarity with the previous work, as well as with the countryside and its residents. By 1948 he was named head of the CDC's Malaria Investigations Section and had oversight of all three of the malaria field stations.
THE POSTWAR YEARS
With the war over, the station's staff set about fieldwork with renewed dedication. Returning members of the staff-Goodwin, Mills, Lofton, and Thompson-were joined by several scientists from the PHS and Emory within a couple of years. The station's organizational structure began to look like that of a modern laboratory, with lead scientists and technicians specializing in various fields. Lead scientists included the entomologists Gory Love and Samuel Breeland from the PHS, the biologist Robert Platt from Emory, and an additional hydrologist from the U.S. Geological Survey, E. L. Hendricks. Scores of technicians filtered through the station during the 1940s and 1950s, all at various stages in their careers either with the PHS or in academia. In addition, the station hosted a number of visiting scientists and graduate student fellows and served as a field training station for CDC staff from Atlanta. According to a 1947 note from Robert Mizell, "scientists in various parts of the country are beginning to take notice and to request the privilege of visiting the station for short term explorations of their own . . . and the Station has now reached the point where it can be used in the technician training programs of both Emory and the Communicable Disease Center." 45 The station became a hub of activity and ideas, with personnel from a wide variety of disciplines.
Melvin Goodwin organized the staff's work along three primary lines of inquiry: epidemiological, hydrological, and biological. The epidemiological work continued the residential visits and blood work that played such a central role at the station before the war, but that effort diminished in importance as it became clear that malaria would likely not return. Goodwin curtailed the routine residential visits after the war because of negligible malaria rates, but Thompson continued to make periodic blood parasite surveys in selected residential areas and at local schools. They also cooperated with the state health department to run a public health clinic in Newton and conducted many immunization clinics at Ichauway throughout the life span of the station. 46 The hydrological and biological lines of inquiry became central to the station's work, which made it an outlier among postwar CDC malaria projects. In 1947, the "extended program" became the "malaria eradication program" (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) , which, as its name suggests, set out to rid North America of malaria through an abundant use of DDT. The promise of DDT gave a new urgency to the long-brewing idea of malaria eradication, and it also simplified the task. The CDC largely abandoned earlier methods of environmental manipulation in favor of scheduled DDT applications in homes in targeted areas. Margaret Humphreys has argued persuasively that this eradication campaign was as much an exercise in "kicking a dying dog," as well as institution building, as anything else. Certainly, the CDC leadership used malaria eradication to justify their funding and build their brand, and the methodology and technology of DDT application became a centerpiece of the CDC's mission during these years, as it did for most malaria projects around the world. 47 But this focus on DDT and eradication tends to obscure much of the scientific work that continued in the field. While the Emory Field Station was part of the structure of eradication, its stated research focus in the immediate postwar years was mosquito and malaria "bionomics," a term that referred to the study of organisms within their natural environment. 48 Bionomics studies were well established by this point, especially in entomology. Past studies, however, had sought to replicate an organism's environmental surroundings in a laboratory setting in an effort to establish experimental controls. The staff at Ichauway did this in their lab, but they also borrowed from ecological concepts to take bionomics a couple of steps further. They not only studied "all aspects of malaria under natural conditions" in the field, according to one PHS report, but also studied the environment itself, especially how changing environmental conditions affected the disease and its vectors. "Much of the work," the report continued, "pertains to fundamental biological problems, since all investigations in field biology are inter-related in some way." 49 To answer one of their central research questionsWhat caused high populations of Anopheles mosquitoes?-they cast a wide net in the field, collecting basic data on weather, hydrological fluctuations, plant and animal life, and mosquito densities and composition. And then they looked for connections, both between their data and between scientific fields of study.
One of the primary research goals was to learn how the area's changing hydrology and geology affected mosquito habitat and, thus, mosquito populations. The mechanics of karst topography, in particular, helped to explain how the Dougherty Plain had become known for malaria in the previous decades. The defining characteristic of karst topography, wherever it may be, is that the cumulative effects of weathering dissolve the bedrock layer beneath the land surface. Streams, creeks, and rivers do the work of erosion as well, but the steady drainage of rainwater through the ground creates a landscape pockmarked by sinkholes above ground and caves below. Limestone is the most common bedrock material in karst regions, and a curious chemical process aids in its dissolution. Pure water would hardly affect limestone, but the addition of carbon dioxide creates carbonic acid, a substance that makes limestone soluble. Decaying plant material emits considerable carbon dioxide, so when ordinary rainwater passes through the soil it soaks up the carbon dioxide as it drains through the cracks, fissures, and pores in the limestone. While karst areas occur throughout the world, the limestone of southwest Georgia is younger and more porous than most. In time, it easily gives way, creating "limesinks" on the surface. These limesinks are shallow depressions that hold water intermittently throughout the year, and they constitute one of the dominant, and dynamic, ecological features of the Dougherty Plain. 50 (See Figure 3 .)
Goodwin and his collaborators knew that the limesinks would be central to their field research. The earlier work of the Rockefeller malariologist Mark Boyd supplied strong circumstantial evidence on the link between karst topography and the distribution of malaria in the Southeast. Along with Gerald Ponton of Florida's State Geological Survey, Boyd used overlapping maps to illustrate how areas with high malaria rates in the 1920s almost invariably correlated with areas underlain with soluble limestone. A. quadrimaculatus preferred the still, clean, alkaline water held by limesinks in these areas, and Boyd's work marked a significant revelation about the environmental particularities of malaria in the South. Despite the disease's yearly fluctuations in severity, Boyd and Ponton recognized that "few of the communicable diseases are as peculiarly diseases of place as is malaria," and the limesink region turned out to be one of the disease's preferred places. 51 Boyd did not, however, have the capacity or the inclination to conduct sustained fieldwork in these places. The hydrological and biological particulars of these watery habitats remained unexamined until the place-based research of the Emory Field Station.
Goodwin and his staff tackled limesink ecology in several stages. First, they conducted extensive hydrological fieldwork to determine what controlled water levels and how waterlevel fluctuations influenced the composition of limesink plant communities. With Mills and Hendricks, Goodwin installed a series of wells and instrument stations in and around thirteen limesinks that measured the daily groundwater and pond-level fluctuations and the amounts of daily precipitation and evaporation; they also monitored the region's streams for changes in depth and current strength. In essence, they sought to explain what happened to precipitation: How did runoff affect pond stages? How much rain remained locked above ground in limesink ponds? How much seeped into the water table? How much drained into established waterways? How much evaporated? How long did all of this take? The ultimate goal was to learn how to predict limesink water levels and the types of watery habitats certain weather conditions might create, thus developing a predictive model for forecasting mosquito densities. The "hydrologic characteristics of these ponds," they concluded, "influence[d] the species and density of plants that become established, and hence affect mosquito production. Thus, hydrology of the region affects directly the health of the inhabitants."
52 (See Figure 4 .) The study of limesinks and their connection to the region's hydrology, then, was an attempt to link human health to environmental change in predictable ways, which really formed the core of the field station's work. As it became clearer that malaria might not return to the South, Goodwin and his staff continued to stress this link as a reason to make the station a center for a broader scientific effort. The hydrological work, for instance, came to represent what might be possible for other lines of inquiry related to mosquitoes and malaria: "it appeared that possible benefit to the field of hydrology, aside from its immediate application to the malaria research program, warranted development of a program designed to study somewhat independently the hydrologic characteristics of limestone-sink terrane." This was one of many times when Goodwin would argue that the station's work had advanced beyond the practical aspects of malaria control. His researchers were asking questions of basic science and looking for results that would speak to a much broader audience. And, indeed, the station's research broadened considerably in its postwar years. With the hydrological characteristics of the region worked out and measurement activities ongoing, the biological work rose to a prominent place in the station's research agenda. The various habits and habitats of Anopheles mosquitoes, not just A. quadrimaculatus, became the primary research focus, which "served as a means of coordinating research and has prevented excursions too far afield," as Goodwin put it in a 1946 report. "But many observations," he continued, "are related to more comprehensive problems in human biology, and much of the work pertains to fundamental biology problems." 53 To examine such problems properly, Goodwin and his staff solicited visiting scientists and graduate students to work on component parts of the region's ecology. They started a fellows program to fund graduate research and offered their equipment and land base to visiting scientists seeking a place for fieldwork. Among the early fellows was Robert Thorne, a graduate student in botany at Cornell, who began a botanical survey during the summers of 1946 and 1947 and returned to Ichauway several times over the life of the station to survey plant communities throughout southwest Georgia. Thorne's work was comprehensive. He produced the most complete plant survey of the region to date, created a herbarium for the station, and identified a number of species previously not known to exist in the state. 54 The plant communities in and around the limesinks were of special interest, because the still water encouraged a blanket growth of surface vegetation that was prime breeding ground for many different species of mosquitoes. Goodwin and company were learning a great deal about limesink hydrology; but they also wanted to find causative linkages between hydrological fluctuations and the watery botanical communities necessary for mosquito breeding. Knowing which limesink plant associations created suitable Anopheles habitat and how those associations responded to hydrological fluctuations became an important piece of the ecological puzzle. What they found-more rain ϭ more habitat ϭ more mosquitoes-was hardly earth-shattering news to anyone. But in the process of reaching that conclusion, they delin- eated the remarkable ecological complexities of the relationship between precipitation and mosquito populations in general and those of the limesink region in particular. 55 As station personnel continued to broaden their approach to malaria ecology, they also became interested in forms of malaria that infected animals such as birds and lizards. The staff remained small and resources for such an endeavor were few, so in 1947 Goodwin reached out to Eugene Odum, a young zoologist at the University of Georgia, to begin wildlife studies at Ichauway. Odum had already used Ichauway's land base for small mammal and avian studies and was well familiar with the work of the field station. When he heard that the station would reopen during the war, Odum thought it perfectly positioned to become a pioneering field base for the interdisciplinary study of ecology. Writing to Herbert Stoddard in 1944, he noted that "the medical aspects of biology on the one hand and the practical agricultural and game management aspects [referring to Stoddard's work in the region] on the other hand are being well worked; in between there are unlimited vistas of 'pure science' research which ultimately may bring man and nature in better harmony." Odum's interest in harmony, or holism, in nature and society became well known a few years later with the publication of his groundbreaking textbook Fundamentals of Ecology (1953) . In it, he first presented the influential model of ecosystems ecology, which argued that component parts of nature sought to reach "homeostasis," a state in which organisms functioned to stabilize whole systems. Humans were part of an ecosystem, according to Odum, but they also represented the primary threat to homeostasis and, thus, to their own health as well. Odum's ecosystem model was not yet fully formed when he joined the station, and he would continue to tweak it throughout his career. But the value of intact environments to human health was on his mind, and the opportunity to join a field station already working on ecological questions as they related to human well-being was surely a boon to his young career. 56 Odum secured fellowships with the station for a succession of his graduate students. While primarily focused on wildlife ecology, these projects supplied critical information on the transmission of malaria parasites among animals. Avian malaria was of special interest. While humans cannot contract it, malaria in birds had a long history of aiding the study of human malaria. Earlier researchers-Ronald Ross, most famously-tracked bird malaria in the 1890s to reveal mosquitoes as the malaria vector, and birds continued to be valuable models for human malaria into the twentieth century. 57 Odum's first graduate student, Robert Norris, aided in this work with his field survey of summer-breeding birds on Ichauway. He introduced several common field methods of wildlife biology to the station, including nest monitoring, trapping, and banding, and also prepared a large collection of bird skins to aid in species identification. Lab technicians examined each collected bird-dead or alive-for blood parasites and extracted any plasmodia for parasitological study in the lab.
Several additional studies of note came from Odum's connection to the station. Like Norris's study of summer-breeding birds, Milton Hopkins's life history study of mourning doves supplied blood specimens for the laboratory. It was also one of the first of its kind in the field, providing not only information on mourning dove ecology but also methods for surveying population numbers of this popular game bird for the Georgia Game and Fish Commission. 59 Goodwin embraced the station's role in such conservation work, at one point reporting that nesting conditions were "not conducive to the conservation of doves"-hardly the stuff of a typical malaria research station report. This was partly a nod to Robert Woodruff and his interest in game birds-dove hunts were among the more popular social activities at Ichauway during the fall of every year. But Goodwin's interest in such studies also stemmed from his general interest in conservation of all sorts, as well as his desire to see a broad range of research at the station. As he had reported a few years earlier, "The Field Station was established for the primary purpose of conducting observations on malaria under natural conditions," but "it is difficult to conceive of investigations in field biology not related in some way."
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In addition to avian malaria, Odum's students also studied other forms of malaria in wildlife. John Crenshaw, for instance, completed a life history of the southern fence lizard (Sceloporus undulatus undulatus) and in the process supplied specimens to Goodwin and developed the field methods for continued fieldwork on saurian malaria after he left. Crenshaw found that female southern fence lizards rarely ranged outside of a thirty-foot radius, so individuals were easily tagged and could be observed repeatedly. Goodwin seized on such access to identify cases of saurian malaria and follow the course of individual infections in the wild. He found a high prevalence of P. floridense in fence lizards-about 40 percent-with patent periods lasting anywhere from three to ten months. 61 As with the bird malarias, these results indicated that despite the disappearance of human malaria, various types of animal malarias persisted at endemic levels. There was no threat of saurian or avian malaria crossing over to humans, but given the ongoing interest in animals as a reservoir for human malaria and possibly responsible for its persistence in some regions today, the research at the field station represents an important marker for early scientific interest in the subject. 62 But more to the point here, this animal research was part of a broader effort at the station to understand the ecology of malaria, and that of the region, on a deeper level.
Given the disappearance of malaria, it comes as no surprise that the Emory Field Station shut down in 1958. But that outcome was never inevitable, and many at Emory and the CDC continued to argue for its relevance. The exact reasons for the shutdown, and who made the call, are still unclear. Besides Clarence Walker, several Woodruff advisors were bewildered by the seemingly esoteric studies carried out at Ichauway. Robert Mizell, for example, in answering a direct question from Woodruff-"Should the Research Program be Continued?"-could only respond, "The only answer I can give is that I don't know. I confess surprise that the work has stirred up so much interest and received so much commendation in USPH circles. I never could tell from my own observation whether anything worth-while was being done. I grant readily the value of the work done by the nurse, but the geologist, entomologist, and engineering angles kept me puzzled." Mizell also recognized his own limitations in judging the significance of the science, as did Woodruff. They both trusted what the experts had to say. In the same letter to Woodruff, Mizell concluded, "So far as I can get the evidence, however, something of value has been started. It seems clear that many scientists will come there if we get better facilities. If something of value has been done, the credit would seem to go to Goodwin." Three years later, Mizell continued to support the program, writing to Woodruff's associate, Joseph Jones, "My guess is that [the station] will continue to grow in usefulness, will attract more and more scientific attention, and will ultimately crystallize Mr. Woodruff's thinking about how Ichauway should be used when he is through with it. It will continue to be a problem to Mr. W[oodruff], to Dean Wood, to you, and me-but anything worth-while presses for attention and is a long problem."
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As it turned out, the station only pressed for attention for another ten years. It officially shut its doors in September 1958, though activity had begun to wind down a couple of years earlier.
Woodruff began to cut his funding soon after Clarence Walker's appraisal in 1953, and the booming CDC had little interest in sustaining a program ostensibly devoted to an absent disease, no matter how impressive the science. In addition, Melvin Goodwin was always the station's strongest advocate, and after he finally received his Ph.D. in biology and parasitology from Emory in 1955 he became the chief of the CDC's Ecology Division, a wide-ranging position that added field stations in Taunton, Massachusetts, and San Juan, Puerto Rico, to his list of responsibilities. The Emory Field Station remained Goodwin's home base for two more years, but these additional duties often took him away and left him out of the loop on critical decisions. Once the CDC transferred Goodwin to lead their field station in Phoenix, Arizona, in October 1957, the end was near. What began with a great deal of fanfare in Baker County, then, ended with barely a mention.
CONCLUSION
The wholesale embrace of DDT in the decades after World War II prevented the field station's work from gaining wide attention in public health circles. Compared to the boldness of the malaria eradication program and the wonder of DDT, ecological research seemed to have an "invisible and indeterminable value" to many. Indeed, it was the CDC's narrow approach to eradication, not its broader field research, that caught on with other malariafighting organizations. The Rockefeller Foundation's International Health Division largely abandoned other control methods, as well as research, for the extensive use of DDT in its malaria programs after the war. And the World Health Organization (WHO) developed its Global Malaria Eradication Programme in 1955, an overly ambitious project that adopted the spraying of DDT as its only plan of attack-and this despite clear evidence that some anopheline species had already developed resistance to DDT. 64 Eradication via DDT was the primary strategy for dealing with malaria for two decades after the war, until an international audience developed its own resistance to the chemical after Rachel Carson published Silent Spring in 1962. That landmark book was the culmination of growing concerns among scientists and laypersons about the harmful effects of chemicals on wildlife and the unknown consequences for humans. Carson's bestseller transformed public perception about DDT and other pesticides; what were once marvels of postwar science and technology were recognized by many as threats to human well-being. As a consequence, public health officials clashed with environmentalists and the use of DDT in public health campaigns gradually waned. The WHO eradication program ended in 1969 -though more because of mosquito resistance and lack of funding and coordination than opposition to DDT-and the United States and most of Europe banned the use of DDT in 1972. 65 The conflict that emerged between public health and environmentalism after Silent Spring had precedent in the interwar years. As I have shown, conservationists and wildlife biologists objected to the methods of sanitary engineers nearly as forcefully as a broader-based environmental movement would later object to chemicals; both objections drew on an ecological worldview that valued intact environments and worried about the consequences when humans interfered. As the work of the Emory Field Station demonstrates, these ecological ideas were not only in conflict with public health work; they also infiltrated it. The knowledge, methods, and ideas of biologists like William Vogt, Herbert Stoddard, Aldo Leopold, Eugene Odum, and others crossed with those of public health practitioners like Melvin Goodwin to form a hybrid science most accurately called disease ecology.
The point here is not to prioritize the ecological worldview that took hold at the Emory Field Station or to suggest that it was the only place where this type of work was happening. Instead, it is to use this case study to suggest ways that public health researchers resisted the course of global malaria policy in the twentieth century, from the prewar penchant for controlling land and water to the postwar preoccupation with spraying chemical insecticides. The experience at the Emory Field Station reveals that the course was never so clear. Diffuse influences, experiences, and places came to bear on disease scientists, leading them in unexpected directions. Even with the contemporary devotion to DDT and eradication, researchers at the Emory Field Station increasingly asked questions about the relationship of human health to environmental change. The CDC's eradication program was loosely organized, with plenty of leeway for agents like Melvin Goodwin to develop an alternative approach that was overshadowed by grander plans but never completely overlooked. In fact, a look at the CDC's field operations after the Emory Field Station's closure reveals a network of stations that retained a broad-based research model similar to that at Ichauway. Under Goodwin's leadership from Phoenix, the Ecology Division continued a multidisciplinary focus on the environmental aspects of disease in response to a number of outbreaks, including dysentery, hepatitis, encephalitis, and other diseases of environmental origin. Goodwin retired from the CDC in 1966 to become director of the Arizona Health Planning Authority, the same year the Ecology Division was folded into the Ecological Investigations Program. This much larger branch oversaw all of the CDC's field stations, and word from the top indicated that their work would explicitly study the relationship between human health and the environment. In a speech at the Fort Collins, Colorado, Field Station in 1967, CDC Chief David Sensor acknowledged the shortcomings of past policy and the promise of the Ecological Investigations Program when he said, "We are emerging from an era during which faith in 'magic drugs' and 'magic insecticides' blunted the critical senses of both scientists and laymen." The Fort Collins station was devoted to studying the ecology of encephalitis, another mosquito-borne disease that reached epidemic status several times in the mid-twentieth century. Despite Sensor's suggestion that global public health had been duped by a faith in silver bullets, he also recognized that a broader methodological framework existed within the CDC for studying and fighting environmentally based diseases. 66 Disease ecology, then, did not simply emerge fully formed in the late twentieth century in response to new diseases; it was part of a longer, if largely shrouded, legacy of ecological thinking among disease researchers. At the Emory Field Station, it surfaced as part of a resistance to environmental transformation in the name of malaria control and continued as an ancillary but insistent focus of disease researchers until changing global circumstances forced it back to the forefront. 67 
